

CLASSIFICATION

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/08/12 : CIA-RDP82-00457R007900530006-5

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 17 AUG 51

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

COUNTRY Korea/China

SUBJECT Supply Situation of Communist Units in Seoul

INTELLOFAX 14

PLACE
ACQUIREDDATE OF
INFO.25X1
25X1

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50
U.S.C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO-
HIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

25X1

1. When the Chinese Communists first entered Seoul, they immediately began house-to-house searches, taking all food and all western-style clothing they could find. After 10 January, markets were opened in East Gate and Ahyon-dong, and there was no further house searching. The Chinese soldiers appeared in the markets, however, and purchased anything they wanted, including American drugs and western-style clothing, regardless of price. They forced the merchants to accept Communist currency* in return. The units that followed the first occupying forces were orderly and well disciplined and did not harm the civilian population.
2. Chinese troops depended upon food supplies sent them from the rear and, after the initial stages of the occupation, requisitioned no food from local people. In the first few days following the entry into Seoul, horse and oxcarts could be seen every night traveling north from Seoul, Yangju, Incheon, and Suwon with loads of food. Soldiers arriving in Seoul from the north carried approximately six to ten litres of corn and millet with them but no more. Villagers in the Seoul area stated that Chinese Communist units competed for the privilege of being the first to enter areas evacuated by the United States forces so that they could obtain American supplies. Their appropriation of supplies was tacitly approved by commanders.
3. In mid-February, in the villages around Seoul, Chinese Communist troops were requisitioning grain, draft animals, and fodder from the local farmers. Sometimes they paid in Communist currency, but more often they gave the farmers receipts printed in the name of the Chinese People's Volunteer Supporters Association, saying that these would be honored later when the association moved into the area. In addition, the Chinese purchased in local markets a variety of articles, showing particular fondness for American products. A Communist soldier paid 2,000 won in Communist currency for a package of American cigarettes.**
4. Many Chinese officers wore American uniforms, underwear, and socks, and some soldiers had American overcoats. One Chinese officer, when asked, said that he had bought his American uniform in China, where the markets were full of American goods sold by the Nationalist soldiers. A Communist soldier admitted that he was wearing an American uniform taken from a war prisoner.

CLASSIFICATION

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NSRB	DISTRIBUTION	FEAT#	CINCPACFLT#				
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBI	COMNAVPHIL#	COMNAVET#	COMFLT#	COMFLT#	CINCP#		

Document No. 25X1
No Change in Class.
Declassified
Class. Changed To TS S E
Approved For Release 2003/08/12 : CIA-RDP82-00457R007900530006-5
Date: 12 JUL 1978

This document is hereby regraded to
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the
letter of 16 October 1978 from the
Director of Central Intelligence to the
President of the United States.

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-2-

5. When the Chinese entered Seoul, they came in groups of five to eight, with one rifle to every three or four men. Throughout their occupation of the city, few Chinese soldiers carried arms, although officers usually had pistols. At first the Seoul residents believed that they must have sent their arms in by transport, secretly, but eventually they came to the conclusion that the Chinese had few weapons. Horse and oxcarts which accompanied the troops were loaded with fuel, spare parts, electric wires taken from occupied areas, or food. No heavy arms were seen in transit through Seoul, and there was a report that the Chinese covered or camouflaged their heavy pieces so well that they could not be easily detected. Since most transport moved at night, Seoul residents believed darkness accounted for their failure to observe any heavy weapons.
6. By the end of February, food supplies in Seoul were very short because of the disruption of supply lines from the north by United Nations air attacks. The North Koreans could requisition food from the local population, but the Chinese were still dependent on outside supplies. North Korean partisans in early March were saying that the Communist forces had to leave Seoul because they had not sufficient food to be able to fight.

25X1* [] Comment. No specific currency was mentioned, and it is not clear whether North Korean won is meant. The only statement made by the source concerning the value of the currency was that one unit was equivalent to ten ROK won. The exchange rate for ROK won is 4,000 to the U.S. dollar.

25X1 ** [] Comment. This would be, according to the value given, 20,000 ROK won. The price of cigarettes in Pusan, for example, is only 2,000 ROK won.